With a mainstream Tarai-based political grouping proposing a constitutional ban on the purchase of land in the plains by “non-Madhesis”, land politics has taken on a new dimension — that of communalism. It is a chilling indication of things to come. If this were to gain momentum, there is no reason not to expect other groups fighting or lobbying for ethnic provinces/states in federal Nepal to make the same demand. In federal, secular India, non-Kashmiris are not allowed to buy land in Kashmir. Is federal, secular Nepal to imitate India’s Kashmir exception and grandiosely turn it into a norm whereby the country becomes a collection of Kashmir-like states?
Restricting land ownership to a particular community has implications for land reform, too. More so for land reform in the Tarai, the country’s bread basket. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the Interim Constitution, the Three-Year Interim Plan and the Common Minimum Program (2008) agreed by the major political parties all have provisions and/or targets for scientific land reform. Land to the tillers was one of the battle cries of the Maoist movement, and other leftist movements before it. The numerical strength the communist parties enjoy in the constituent assembly is unparalleled in Nepal’s parliamentary history. If land reform, including imposition of ownership ceilings and redistribution, cannot be enforced now, it is well-nigh impossible that it ever will for several decades to come.
The modus operandi: First enforce a ban on purchase by “outsiders” and then resist any national land reform program on the grounds that it is imposed from outside and instead float the idea of a “locally evolved” reform.
Proponents of redistributive land reform cite these facts: 7.5 percent of farmers still own nearly a third of farming area; nearly half of all agricultural holdings (47.7 percent) are too small to enable a family to meet subsistence requirements (less than 0.5 ha); at least 10 percent of rural households (half a million) have absolutely no home or land at all; nearly 60 percent of rural households are thus functionally landless; and 40 percent of those with no land or land under 1 ha (75 percent of all farming households in 2001 had less than 1 ha) are below the poverty line. They blame low agricultural productivity largely on unequal land distribution, insecure tenure and absenteeism.
If land reform is needed, it is needed most badly in the Tarai. A scoping study on land reform commissioned by the Department for International Development (DFID), of the United Kingdom, says that by agro-ecological zone, inequity in ownership is the highest in the Tarai, where most large holdings are found and most outright landlessness exists, suggesting that the region must be the focal area in any redistributive reform initiative.
The Gini coefficient—a measure of inequality in distribution that takes values from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating greater inequality—of land distribution in the Tarai is 0.569 as against 0.489 in the Hills and 0.484 in the Mountains. The three most landless districts are Sunsari (51.5 percent), Morang (48 percent) and Jhapa (38.9 percent). Most of the households either farming on rented land or on both own and rented land are in the Tarai. Among social groups, the percentage of landless households is 20 percent among Tarai Janjatis as opposed to 8 percent among Hill Janjatis, and 43.98 percent among Tarai Dalits as opposed to 15.32 percent among Hill Dalits.
Is the proposal to ban purchase by “outsiders” a ploy to perpetuate iniquitous land ownership in the Tarai? What if the new rulers of the federal state, basically representing large landowners of a particular community, pay lip service to land reform much the same way national rulers hitherto are said to have done? This may very well be the case. The modus operandi: First enforce a ban on purchase by “outsiders” and then resist any national land reform program on the grounds that it is imposed from outside and instead float the idea of a “locally evolved” reform, with “outsider” landowners presumably in the crosshairs.
And let us assume other would-be states take the same approach. In a country where 80 percent of households are agricultural, with land being the most important asset, the consequences will be disastrous. The fate of every “outsider” agricultural household will hang in the balance. Expansion of land ownership by such farming households to increase production will be out of question.
The optimist would consider such fears farfetched—cool, rational heads will eventually prevail over brinkmanship. But the lure of power that a federal set-up offers could be irresistible, more so the power to hold the entire nation hostage. If a person born of foreign immigrants in Nepal just two decades ago and who can furnish proof of domicile in this country can become a bonafide Nepali citizen, and in most cases would also benefit from the national reservation policy, anything can happen here.
What about other political parties? The Maoists are busy with their own land politics. No sooner had party chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal ‘Prachanda’ resigned as prime minister than the party rank and file resumed their “barren” land capture drive. Their land reform agenda has changed from a revolutionary slogan to a bargaining chip that comes in handy when the political going hits rough weather. Leaders may be ready to compromise, but may find it impossible to satisfy rank-and-file cadres, who do not have so short a memory as to forget the original battle cry so soon. Inciting cadres to seize the property of people unsympathetic or perceived as being unsympathetic to the Maoist cause, branding all of them “feudals”, was easy. Now to tell those who have settled on those lands to leave would seem like political suicide. By dispossessing and displacing thousands of landowners out of political vendetta during the insurgency years, and still refusing to return the seized property to the rightful owners, the Maoists have unwittingly shorn their land reform agenda of any legitimacy. Instrumental in forcing open the Pandora’s Box of communal federalism in Nepal, Maoist leaders would know in their heart of hearts that the Frankenstein they created is now beyond their control, and that a demand such as banning land purchase by “outsiders” is but an offshoot of their own rabble-rousing chorus.
As a left party, the CPN-UML officially still champions the land reform agenda. It fathered the High-Level Land Reform Commission headed by Keshab Badal during its nine-month minority government in 1994/95. The party leadership’s commitment to land reform apparently waned over the years, as it did not pursue it with the same vigor. But when the Maoists joined the political mainstream, it was jolted out of its slumber. Not to be outdone by the ex-rebels, it must keep the land reform slogan alive if only to burnish its revolutionary image. Whether land reforms get implemented or not is beside the point. Communal federalism’s implications for land reform are best swept under the carpet.
As for the Nepali Congress, it never really owned the redistributive land reform agenda, though party activists proudly make references to the late BP Koirala’s vision of a tiller owning the land s/he tills. It missed the opportunity to implement land reform when it ruled the roost in Singha Durbar for most of the years after the 1990 restoration of democracy. It never quite had a sense of attachment with the two amendments to the Lands Act 1964 made in 1997 and 2001, partially incorporating some of the recommendations of the Badal Commission, including transfer of 50 percent of owners’ land to registered tenants and reduced ceilings.
Yet it rarely misses an opportunity to rail against the failure of the 1964 Lands Act, the first serious crack at land reform in Nepal. That Act set ceilings on ownership and had redistributive provisions for the first time—something that the 1957 Lands Act could not do. Though evasion was rampant, the introduction of ceilings and redistribution provisions, at that time and age, was in itself a revolutionary initiative. The 1960s also saw a slew of other land reform measures. If weak implementation was the crux of problem back then, it remains so till this day—two people’s movements later. There has been precious little progress in terms of redistribution in the last two decades. Half a century of land reform attempts have seen redistribution of only 2 percent of total private landholdings.
For those who have observed Nepali Congress’ failure to make the Maoists return the seized property to the rightful owners, many of them its own supporters or perceived as being so, it is futile to expect the party to effectively oppose the proposed ban on land purchase by “outsiders”.
Civil society leaders? Some may find communal federalism a godsend to realize their political ambitions. For some, it may mean continued roaring business. Others may not care what happens outside Kathmandu Valley, but will surely fight tooth and nail any “unreasonably low” land ceiling for Kathmandu Valley and hire a battery of lawyers to wriggle through legal loopholes. (By the way, the Badal Commission recommended a ceiling of 0.5 ha in the urban areas of Kathmandu Valley.)
Combined with communal politics, land politics is unlikely to fade away anytime soon. However, the true goal of land reform—to ensure socio-economic justice, boost agricultural production and enhance the overall efficiency of the economy—is likely to remain as elusive as ever.
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